Inspector General Gives LA County Sheriff’s Dept. (Mostly) Good Grades in Report on Jail Force Investigations (Except for Those Pesky Bad Grades)

AUDIT OF USE-OF-FORCE INVESTIGATIONS INSIDE LA COUNTY’S JAILS FINDS MUCH PROGRESS, WITH MORE STILL NEEDED

In a first ever outside audit of the reformed process for investigating complaints by inmates alleging improper use of force inside Los Angeles County’s various jail facilities, Inspector General Max Huntsman gave the LA County Sheriff’s Department fairly good grades on its performance, with 12 areas that could use improvement.

The report, which was presented to a gathering of county officials on Wednesday, covered a period of from January 1, 2013, through September 30, 2014.

It should be noted that, this particular OIG’s report doesn’t look at the outcomes of the force complaints. Nor does it follow behind the department’s investigations to see if the the conclusions reached seem—well—correct. At this point, the OIG merely looked at methodology, to see if all the proper marks are being hit in the new and improved process of investigating force complaints, and, if not, making recommendations as to what ought to be done about it.

The audit looked at 14 “Objectives,” and found that, out of the randomly selected sampling of 57 investigations of force complaints, the majority hit most of their marks.

Yet, in certain categories, a percentage—and in some instances, a significant percentage—failed to appropriately comply.

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NO FOXES MAY INVESTIGATE THE HENHOUSE

For example, one of the categories that caused the OIG concern was Objective 2, the no-brainer requirement that the supervisor conducting the investigation of a force complaint cannot be someone who was involved in that alleged force issue, or was a direct witness of the alleged use of force in question.

Out of the 57 cases audited, in four cases (7.0%) the investigation of allegation-of-force was conducted by a supervisor “alleged to have been involved in or a witness to the incident.”

The good news is that, in 53 out 57 cases, an appropriate supervisor did the investigating. The bad news is that there were any supervisors at all who thought it was a fine idea to investigate an allegation in which they were involved or were a witness.

Or as the OIG’s report diplomatically put it: “While the compliance percentage in this area was high, it is of such critical importance that any failure to follow policy in this regard requires correction.”

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THE IMPORTANCE OF NOTIFYING INMATES ABOUT OUTCOMES OF INVESTIGATIONS

One of the categories in which custody personnel failed miserably pertained to a requirement that emerged as a consequence of the huge class action lawsuit, Rosas v. Baca, which species that:

“An inmate should be advised of the results of the Department’s investigation of the inmate grievance against personnel, but not any sanction imposed, within 10 days of the Department’s adjudication of the grievance.”

The notification must also be in writing.

Out of 57 cases, in two cases the inmate was properly informed regarding what happened with their complaint. In the other 55 cases, there is no evidence that the inmate was informed in writing, if at all.

Obviously, if an inmate files a force allegation in good faith, and hears nothing about the matter ever again, it does not exactly encourage the filing of force complaints—righteous or otherwise.

Or as the OIG’s report put it:

“The Office of Inspector General regularly hears that prisoners believe their complaints are disregarded or not conveyed. Failure to provide notice fosters such a belief.”

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MEDICAL TREATMENT MATTERS.

Another area in which there was a 10 to 20 plus percent breakdown in compliance had to do with medical treatment for alleged victims of force.

Objective 5 specifies that jail personnel are required to make sure the inmate on whom certain categories of force was used—or allegedly used—is examined and treated by medical personnel—particularly if the inmate “alleges any injury and requests medical treatment, whether or not they have any apparent injuries.”

Out of the sample cases audited where medical attention would have been appropriate, in 11 percent of the cases there was no evidence in the report that the inmate had ever been examined by medical personnel. Nor was there documentation that the inmate had refused medical help.

Similarly, when it came to Objective 6, which “requires that the force package includes documentation showing suitable treatment from qualified medical personnel was sought and/or received,” in 12.5 percent of the cases audited, the appropriate documentation was nowhere to be found.

And, in that same vein, there is Objective 4, which specifies that the investigating supervisor is required to interview “the attending physician or other qualified medical personnel…as to the extent and nature of the suspect’s injuries, or lack thereof, and whether the injuries are consistent with the degree of force reported . . . .” When it came to this objective, a worrisome 21.8 percent of the cases the supervisors either failed to conduct the required interview, or failed to document ever having done so.

Interestingly, when it came to these medical issues, the Inmate Reception Center had the highest percentage of failures to comply, with Men’s Central Jail and Century Regional Detention Facility running in second place.

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THE ART OF THE VIDEO INTERVIEW

A curious glitch in a few cases had to do with Objective 3, the requirement to interview the inmate making the complaint on video, and then to include the video in the investigative package.

In the cases of four investigations, there was no video interview of the inmate included at all.

(For the record, three of those four force packages sans video interviews were turned in at MCJ.)

Even in those cases where the interview or interviews were recorded on video and included in the report, a bunch of those were reportedly less than ideal. Here’s what the report said:

We noted in our review that several of the video interviews were dark, shaky, contained muffled voices, or did not include the subject of the interview in the video frame. For example, a sergeant conducting one interview videotaped only the inmate’s nostrils during the entire interview.Another video depicted the ground as the sergeant spoke with the inmate. In another, the voice of the sergeant and the inmate were muffled and barely audible.

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TIMELINESS? NOT SO MUCH

And then there is that annoying timelessness requirement. To wit:

“The watch commander or supervising lieutenant shall prepare and submit a force package to the Unit Commander for all reviews of force not conducted by an IAB Force/Shooting Response Team as soon as possible, but no later than 21 days after the incident, unless otherwise directed . . . .”

How did the jails do? Not well. Less than half (46.5 percent) of the cases met the 21-day deadline, while 54.5 percent did not.

When we poked around a little more we found that, according to the report’s foot-noted fine print, the average amount of time it took the watch commander or supervising lieutenant to prepare and submit an allegation‐of‐force package to the unit commander was 69 days.

And the longest amount of time was….386 days— by which point, if there was any wrongdoing, the year-long drop dead date for such an investigation would—we presume—have passed.

So, yes, the OIG’s report suggests that much progress has been made since the bad-old-days when boxes full of force packages were blithely deep-sixed in cupboards and drawers by certain high ranking supervisors, and inmates who attempted to report bad uses force were not-so-gently discouraged from doing so with threats and pernicious forms of retaliation.

And, the reply from Sheriff McDonnell sent in response to the Inspector General’s recommendations, we learn that many of the concerns had already been corrected in the time between the reporting period and now.

But, while the change is cheering, there’s still some healthy room for improvement—much of which seems to be already moving forward.