WHEN A “MODEL” PRISON BREAKS BAD
What has caused so many of our nation’s prisons to abandon any attempt at rehabilitation in order to keep large numbers of prisoners in isolation, or near isolation, in “Special Housing Units” (SHUs} or in “Special Management Units,” (SMUs)?
Justin Peters, writing for Slate, looks at that question with an analysis of what happened to the the prison at Lewisburg, PA, that in the 1930s started out as a model of innovation, and that now typifies the trend toward SHUs and SMUs.
Here’s a clip:
Last month, I wrote about Marion, the notorious federal prison that helped pave the way for all the supermax-style facilities that are so popular today. Though Marion was under lockdown for an astounding 23 years, the prison itself became a medium-security facility in 2006, and is no longer a repository for the most troublesome prisoners in the federal system. That honor arguably now belongs to USP Lewisburg, a Pennsylvania facility where violent or obstreperous federal inmates get sent for ostensibly short-term “attitude adjustment” stints. (Before transferring out, inmates are expected to complete a four-stage, 18-to-24-month resocialization program that can actually last much longer than that.) USP Lewisburg might be the worst place in the federal prison system, so bad that some inmates there actually dream of being transferred to the famously isolating Supermax facility in Florence, Colo.
A recent article from the journal Environment and Planning D: Society and Space helps explain how Lewisburg got that way. The article, by Bucknell University geography professor Karen M. Morin, recounts the transformation of USP Lewisburg from a progressive facility to an isolating and restrictive “Special Management Unit,” or SMU—a shift that mirrors the evolution of the U.S. prison system in general. (Morin is also a member of the Lewisburg Prison Project, a nonprofit group that advocates for prisoners’ rights.) Whereas model prisons 75 years ago were designed to rehabilitate prisoners, the best-known prisons today seem specifically designed to drive their inmates mad.
Also read Peters’ October 23 story in Slate about how, in 1983, two horrific murders at the United States Penitentiary near Marion, Ill, ushered in America’s infatuation with Supermax prisons.
In addition, take a look at the report released earlier this year by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) at the request of a Congressional committee that wanted to know more about why the US Bureau of Prisons was making increasing use of SHUs and SMUs, and whether all this isolation made the prisons safer.
In their report, the GAO stated it wasn’t at all sure that widespread use of isolation did increase institutional safety and pointed to the five states that had reduced their reliance on the segregated units.
“While these states have not completed formal assessments of the impact of their segregated housing reforms, officials from all five states told us there had been no increase in violence after they moved inmates from segregated housing to less restrictive housing. In addition, Mississippi and Colorado reported cost savings from closing segregated housing units and reducing the administrative segregation population.”
WHY BIG DATA MATTERS FOR CALIFORNIA’S CRIMINAL AND JUVENILE JUSTICE POLICIES
This is one of those issues that one would hope would be obvious:: In order to make good criminal and juvenile justice policy (or any kind of policy, for that matter) we need good numbers—specifically, we need stats that tell us which policies work, and which do not.
Yet, incredibly, all too often, lawmakers and others fail to bother.
Take, for instance, the matter of realignment. For all the money, stress and time spent on the state’s two-year-old prison realignment policy, there was no provision in the law for any kind of evaluation to determine what part of realignment worked—either on a statewide level, or in the individual counties—and what did not.
Yes, some federal dollars and foundation money has found its way to Stanford, allowing Joan Petersilia and company to do limited research. But it isn’t the kind of money needed for meaningful programatic evaluation. So, in its most recent report, Stanford was left to make do by asking various “stakeholders’ around the state—law enforcement, probation, district attorneys and such—for their opinions of how things were going with realignment. (And we wrote about the resulting report earlier this month.] All very well and good. But—as Petersilia would be the first to point out—opinions are not numbers.
Brian Goldstein (of the Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice) elaborates further on the numbers issue in his short but must read essay.
Here’s a clip:
Data analysis is the basic metric to measure the success or failure of public policy. Absent useable data, researchers, policymakers, and the general public cannot accurately judge whether an approach is working and must make uneducated guesses. For example, national polling finds that people often mistakenly exacerbate crime trends. In 2011 a majority of Americans believed crime was getting worse as the country was experiencing a steady 15-year decline. Crime data is the only way to fight the undue influence of misperception and anecdotal evidence.
Corporate America recognizes the need to develop long-term strategies for collection and utilization of data. Books on “Big Data” top bestseller lists and statisticians, such as Nate Silver, have well-deserved influence over electoral politics, business, and health practices. Unfortunately, government has been slow to use data analysis for decision-making.
Data collection standards remain a central issue in California-albeit one that rarely gets the attention it certainly deserves. California’s data collection systems, specifically in the criminal and juvenile justice field, demands continued attention and resources to best serve our state.
Specifically, Goldstein points out the failure to collect usable data that plagues California’s Board of State and Community Corrections (BSCC)—AKA the board that is specifically tasked by state law with such data gathering. To wit:
“The [BSCC] board shall seek to collect and make publicly available up-to-date data and information reflecting the impact of state and community correctional, juvenile justice, and gang-related policies and practices enacted in the state…” California Penal Code Section 6024-6031.6.
So do they?
Goldstein says, No. Not really.
In March 2013, the BSCC released the Third Annual Report to the Legislature on the Youthful Offender Block Grant. The report tracks YOBG expenditures, with a total $93.4 million given to California counties in FY 2011-12. However, with the release of the report, the BSCC admits significant challenges in tracking performance outcomes. They note,
“The nature of the data collected precludes our ability to draw inferences about cause and effect relationships between services and outcomes….
Collecting unusable data is unacceptable. Governor Brown, state legislators, and policy advocates must ensure that the BSCC has the staffing, resources, and leadership necessary to meet its mandate on data collection.
Yep. What he said.
INNOVATIVE SOLANO COUNTY FINDS SMART WAYS TO HELP HIGH RISK LAW BREAKING KIDS
Speaking of numbers: The Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice (CJCJ) has just released a new report that looks at the innovative juvenile programs in Solano County that specifically address high risk youth.
In the report, CJCJ analyzes seven years of data to determine how Solano’s programs have affected the post lock-up outcomes of the kids they served. The report also compares Solano’s cost per kid with those of the state.
Here’s a clip from a story on Solano’s programs by Selena Teji, CJCJ’s Communications and Policy Analyst:
…In 1959, Solano County dedicated itself to taking responsibility for its high-risk youth. Fouts Springs Youth Facility was built as a regional alternative to reliance on the state youth correctional system, and it accepted youth who had serious, violent delinquent histories and who had failed to successfully complete other placements. The decision to create a local custody option for high-risk youth was developed out of a recognition that youth eventually return to their communities, which made reentry planning and aftercare essential components of effective juvenile justice programming. Unfortunately, the state has not been able to provide adequate reentry services to the youth in its care due to the sparsity of its facilities and parole services.
A new study of youth served by Fouts Springs from 2005 to 2011 shows that not only was the program more successful than the state facilities, with a 35 percent recidivism rate compared to the state’s 75 percent recidivism rate, but it was also significantly cheaper to operate. Fouts Springs cost approximately $32,100 per youth for its average length of stay, whereas an average placement in the state youth correctional facilities costs around $778,500. While counties paid a nominal $213 per month to commit youth to the state facilities until 2012 (when a larger flat rate fee was introduced), a commitment to Fouts Springs would set a county back $4,200 per month. The fiscal disincentive paired with the decrease of youth crime statewide lessened the demand for a regional program and resulted in the closure of Fouts Springs in 2011.
Yet, Solano County has continued to aggressively pursue adaptable, individually-focused, holistic approaches to serving justice-involved youth…
Read the rest of the story at the Juvenile Justice Information Exchange.
$50,000 REWARD GOES TO $100K FOR INFORMATION REGARDING HIT & RUN DEATH OF POPULAR LA COUNTY PROBATION OFFICER
The Los Angeles City Council put up the first $50,000 and now LA County Supervisors Mike Antonovich and Gloria Molina pushed for another $50,000 to be added to the pot, in the hope of uncovering information leading to the arrest of the hit-and-run driver who caused the death of a well-like LA County Probation officer, high school coach, and father of three, Kenneth Hamilton last month.
CBS-2 News has more on the story. Here’s a clip:
Kenneth Hamilton, 54, was leaving his job at the Eastlake Juvenile Facility around 6 a.m. on Oct. 28 when he was hit at the intersection of Soto Street and Lancaster Avenue in Boyle Heights.
He died instantly, the Los Angeles Police Department said.
“Someone out there knows something, saw something or may even know the driver who fled,” Chief Probation Officer Jerry Powers said. “The reward money is a reminder that Los Angeles has not forgotten, the LAPD has not forgotten and that this crime must be solved and the driver brought to justice.”
Police identified the suspect vehicle as a late 1990s silver four-door Honda Civic DX from a side mirror that was sheared off in the crash.
“This is like losing one of our own,” LAPD Det. Michael Kaden said.
Anyone with information was asked to contact Det. Kaden at (213) 972-1837.
Thanks so much for bellyaching about the lack of data. Makes me nuts. How do we champion what works when we don’t know! Grrrrr!